

County of Sutter

Emergency Operations Plan



Sutter Operational Area

Annex 12

Terrorism

February 2015

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Section 1 – INTRODUCTION

General

In the wake of the World Trade Center bombing in New York and the Oklahoma City bombing, terrorism has become an increasing concern for emergency management, emergency responders, and the public at large.

The purpose of this annex is to develop a consequence management plan for responding to and recovering from a terrorist-initiated incident, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Emergency Plan Management and Updates

The Office of Emergency Management will be responsible for updates and maintenance of this plan.

Authority Citations

The authority for Emergency Operations and Disaster Preparedness used in development of this annex of the Sutter County Operational Area EOP can be found in the **Sutter County OA EOP, Basic Plan, Chapter A, Section 6.**

This plan augments the Sutter County Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan, dated October 2011.

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Section 2 – PLAN OVERVIEW

Concept of Operations

This plan or the applicable portions of this plan will be implemented as directed by the County Administrative Officer, Sheriff, County Fire Chief, Emergency Operations Manager, Health Officer, or Incident Commander as appropriate.

Guidance for implementation is in the **EOP Basic Plan Chapter D, Response Phase - Initial Response** page D-4-1 and in **ANNEX 1 - Emergency Support Functions Handbook and Checklists, Section 3, General Response Checklists** for Sheriff and Fire Services.

Additional supplemental information is provided in the attachments of this annex.

During a disaster or emergency, this plan will be implemented in accordance with the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).

Personnel assigned to the organizational levels of SEMS will follow checklists/SOPs established by the EOP or the appropriate annex to the EOP. Communication equipment usage will be determined by the Emergency Operations Director and any equipment issued to an emergency worker will be documented and tracked to ensure proper accountability of the asset. Coordination of public or media information releases will be through the PIO. The Management function of SEMS will determine what information is to be released and when the appropriate timeframe for such a release will occur.

For more information on SEMS/ICS refer to the **Sutter County OA EOP Basic Plan, Chapter A, Section 3**. The SEMS functions for a terrorism response are indicated in this annex ***Attachment A, Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism***.

The federal Department of Homeland Security has established that the National Incident Management System (NIMS) will be used during an emergency/disaster. The State of California, through Executive Order S-2-05, has established that the implementation of SEMS/ICS substantially meets the requirements of NIMS.

For more information on NIMS refer to the **Sutter County OA EOP Basic Plan, Chapter A, Section 3**.

In accordance with California Terrorism Response Plan, dated August 1998, this plan reflects two terms in the emergency management field:

- Crisis Management
- Consequence Management

Crisis Management

Crisis Management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists, and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

The federal government exercises lead authority and responsibility in crisis management. The federal crisis management effort is lead by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary.

Consequence Management

Consequence Management addresses the consequences of terrorism, the effects upon people, their property, and their communities. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

The State of California and local agencies exercise lead authority to make decisions regarding the consequences of terrorism. Under California SEMS, this authority would normally rest with the incident commander and local Emergency Management organization. The federal government provides assistance as required. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates federal agencies consequence management support with the State of California.

Structure

The Terrorism Annex to the **Sutter County OA EOP Basic Plan** is a compendium on the management of terrorist incidents. It focuses on the management of the event as well as linkage to the response and recovery actions to terrorist incident(s).

- **Response actions** includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.
 1. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required.
 2. Response actions are predominantly law enforcement oriented and address both initial and continuing actions associated with the terrorist event.
 3. Based on the situation and type of terrorist event, a State or a State/Federal initial and continuing response may be supported by State-designated shared lead agencies, technical operations, additional State and Federal assets, all of which may operate concurrently.
- **Recovery actions** include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the terrorism event.
 1. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond both initially and on a continuing basis to the recovery requirements of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.
 2. Recovery actions can and often do, operate concurrently with Response Actions.

Section 3 - HAZARD/THREAT ANALYSIS FOR TERRORISM

General

The following is a general guide for terrorism hazards:

1. This annex will help to identify and discuss the nature of the terrorist hazard(s). The hazard may be WMD (including conventional explosives, secondary devices, and combined hazards) or other means of attack (including low-tech devices and delivery, attacks on infrastructure, and cyber terrorism).
2. **Terrorism** involves the use or threatened use of criminal violence against people, institutions, livestock, food sources or facilities to achieve a political or social objective through fear and intimidation, rather than direct confrontation. Unlike a disaster caused by nature or an accident involving hazardous materials, it requires the deliberate and premeditated action of a person or group to occur.
3. **Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** – Weapons of mass destruction are defined as any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; radiation or radioactivity; or explosion or fire. At least two important considerations distinguish these hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and medical technicians. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on battlefield exposures to WMD agents, there is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect civilian populations. They are described in law as:
 - a. **Incendiary/Explosives** – The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Projectiles and missiles, including aircraft used against high-profile targets such as buildings, monuments, and special events, also can cause explosions and fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Historically, less than five percent of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little signature and are not readily detectable. Secondary explosive devices may also be used as weapons against responders and the public in coincident acts. Other diversionary events or attacks could also be aimed at responders.

b. **Combined Hazards** – WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect – greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities.

c. **Biological** – Recognition of a biological hazard can occur through several methods, including identification of a credible threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent, clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent), and detection (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data). When people are exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox, they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health community. Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local, State or even National economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning process. Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event. Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox, plague). Some indicators of biological attack are given in *Table 1*.

Table 1. General Indicators of Possible Biological Agent Use

Stated Threat to Release a Biological Agent
Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals
Unusual Casualties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unusual illness for region/area • Definite pattern inconsistent with natural disease
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spraying; suspicious devices, packages, or letters

d. **Chemical** – Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate reaction from emergency responders—fire departments, police, hazardous materials (HazMat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious consequences. Some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents are listed in *Table 2*. Early in an investigation, it may not be obvious whether an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical caused an outbreak; however, most chemical attacks will be localized, and their effects will be evident within a few minutes. There are both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.

Table 2. General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical Agent
Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For example, lack of insects, dead birds
Unexplained Casualties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple victims • Surge of similar 911 calls • Serious illnesses • Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, or convulsions • Definite casualty patterns
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Droplets, oily film • Unexplained odor • Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather
Suspicious Devices, Packages, or Letters <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unusual metal debris • Abandoned spray devices • Unexplained munitions

e. **Nuclear and radiological** – The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. In an explosion, the fact that radioactive material was involved may or may not be obvious, depending upon the nature of the explosive device used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain, unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and have been trained to use it properly. Although many detection devices exist, most are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for measuring or

ruling out the presence of radiological hazards. *Table 3* lists some indicators of a radiological release.

Table 3: General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological Agent Use

Stated Threat to Deploy a Nuclear or Radiological Device
Presence of Nuclear or Radiological Equipment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Spent fuel canisters or nuclear transport vehicles
Nuclear Placards/Warning Materials Along with Otherwise
Unexplained Casualties

The scenarios constituting an intentional nuclear/radiological emergency include the following:

- 1) Use of an **improvised nuclear device (IND)** includes any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the type of trigger device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices. While “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency of a given device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.
- 2) Use of a **radiological dispersal device (RDD)** includes any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material upon detonation. By placing radiological material in close proximity, any improvised device could be used.
- 3) Use of a **simple RDD** that spreads radiological material without the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner.

f. **Cyber-terrorism** – Cyber terrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation’s critical infrastructures in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives (FBI NIPC, Congressional testimony, August 29, 2001). As with other critical infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on security measures to protect computer systems against intrusions, denial of service attacks, and other forms of attack rather than addressing issues related to contingency and consequence management planning. However, emergency management planning efforts for the year 2000 (Y2K) transition provided a real-world exercise and a prototype for developing and implementing systems to respond to the consequences of massive computer outages. FEMA’s Y2K guidance, *Contingency and Consequence Management Planning for Year 2000 Conversion: A Guide for State and Local Emergency Managers* (<http://www.fema.gov/y2k/ccmp.htm>), is relevant for developing contingency and consequence management plans for cyber terrorism. Jurisdictions that developed plans for the Y2K transition have an excellent start in planning for the consequences of cyber terrorism because they have contingencies to

handle interruptions and plans to restore critical services. *Table 4* lists some indicators of a cyber-terrorism attack.

Table 4: General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack

Stated Threat of a Cyber-terrorism Attack
Detection of a Computer Virus by a Software Program
Unexplained Malfunctioning of a Computer Control System That Could Result in Injury or Death <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dam or Levee • 9-1-1 System • Streetlights • Air Traffic Control System
Collapse of Infrastructure Computer System <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electric Power Grid • Nuclear Power Plant • Water Treatment Plant
Collapse of Vital Computer Databases <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NCIC

g. **Agro-terrorism** – Any terrorist act using biological agents, achieved by poisoning the food or water supplies or by introducing diseases among livestock. *Table 5* lists some indicators of an agro-terrorism attack.

Table 5: General Indicators of Possible Agro-terrorism Attack

Stated Threat to Release a Chemical/Biological Agent into the Agriculture Industry
Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor or Powder
Unexplained Presence of Dead or Dying Animals, Birds and/or Insects
Presence of Abandoned Spray Devices

4. **Other Terrorism Hazards** – Planners also need to consider the possibility of unusual or unique types of terrorist attacks previously not considered likely. Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every conceivable type of terrorist attack, planners should anticipate that future terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex, sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for

terrorist incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the unexpected. These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the consequences of attacks using low-tech devices and delivery, assaults on public infrastructure, and cyber terrorism. In these cases, the training and experience of the responders may be more important than detailed procedures.

a. **Low-Tech Devices and Delivery** – Planning for the possibility of terrorist attacks must consider the fact that explosives can be delivered by a variety of methods. Most explosive and incendiary devices used by terrorists would be expected to fall outside the definition of a WMD. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public areas for later detonation, or they can be attached directly to a suicide bomber for detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist feels that maximum damage can be done. The relatively small size of these explosive devices and the absence of specific security measures in most areas make these types of terrorist attacks extremely difficult to prevent. Small explosive devices can also be brought onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand carried. Although present airline security measures minimize the possibility of explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider the level of security presently employed on ships, trains, and buses within their jurisdictions. Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended target area by means of car or truck bombs. Planners need to consider the possible need to restrict or prohibit vehicular traffic within certain distances of key facilities identified as potential terrorist targets. Planners may also need to consider the possible use of concrete barriers to prevent the forced entry of vehicles into restricted areas.

b. **Infrastructure Attacks** – Potential attacks on elements of the nation’s infrastructure require protective considerations. Infrastructure protection involves proactive risk management actions taken to prevent destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks and systems that serve society, according to the 1997 report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. This commission was formed in 1996 to evaluate the vulnerability to disruption of the nation’s infrastructures, including electric power, oil and natural gas, telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, and vital government services. The commission’s report, issued in October 1997, concluded, “Waiting for disaster is a dangerous strategy. Now is the time to act to protect our future.”

1) Infrastructure protection often is more focused on security, deterrence, and law enforcement than on emergency consequence management preparedness and response. Nevertheless, planners must develop contingencies and plans in the event critical infrastructures are brought down as the result of a terrorist incident.

2) Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued in May 1998. It established the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and outlined steps to be taken to protect critical infrastructures from disruptions that could have serious public health and safety, economic, or national security impacts. Among other things, the Directive called on the Federal government to engage in “close cooperation and coordination with State and local governments ... for a robust and flexible infrastructure protection program.” A number of resources are available to State

and local planners, most notably through CIAO and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC).

Hazard Analysis and Assessment

According to the "Threat Matrix" (**Refer to Sutter County OA EOP Basic Plan Chapter B Section 2**), terrorism is an infrequent hazard with moderate to high severity to the county.

An assessment of the potential risks within the jurisdiction should be conducted. However, jurisdictions are encouraged to maintain the list in a secure area and that it is not accessible for public consumption.

1. Each of the terrorism hazards listed above should be addressed separately regarding at-risk facilities, areas, and/or infrastructure and the potential for incidents within the jurisdiction.
2. Attachment B provides the Emergency Management Team with information for FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (COUNTERTERRORISM-SPECIFIC ROLES).

Threat Analysis for Terrorism

The California Terrorism Response Plan, dated August 1998, describes the Threat Notification Procedure used by the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) and FBI. Upon receipt of a terrorist threat, Sutter County will notify the appropriate FBI office. Depending upon the threat, the county may choose to notify the Sheriff, County Fire Chief, and selected departments. Notification of the OES Regional Office may also occur.

The County of Sutter has developed a broad threat assessment of potential terrorist targets. This assessment is contained in a restricted use planning document maintained by the Sutter County Office of Emergency Management. The information contained in this document will be used as necessary during a threat situation or actual event.

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Section 4 – PLAN RESPONSIBILITIES

The following is a general guide of the responsibilities for the Emergency Organization:

Management

Management assignments are reflected in *Attachment A, Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism*.

Mental health support and psychological operations will be essential elements of the terrorism response approach.

Organizational Structure

The County of Sutter will activate the appropriate SEMS functions based upon the terrorist threat or actual event. Personnel from Sutter County will be assigned to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) if activated or requested.

If the FBI activates its Incident Command Post (ICP), a representative from law enforcement will be supplied by Sutter County.

Sutter County will also provide representation to, and participate in, the Unified Command, once established.

Coordination of Disciplines

Sutter County will use multi-agency, multi-discipline coordination in its response to a terrorist threat or event.

A Unified Command will be established from the various agencies with responsibility for the incident. The Unified Command will facilitate coordination among agencies and disciplines.

Inclusion of Non-Profit Agencies/Organizations

Non-profit organizations, such as the American Red Cross will be involved in terrorism response planning. Sutter County will contact the appropriate non-profit organizations in the event of a potential threat or actual event.

Public Information

Sutter County is committed to a proactive public information program during a terrorist threat or actual event.

The Public Information Officer (PIO) will be activated as soon as practical during a terrorist threat or actual event. The PIO will coordinate with media for news releases.

If the federal government establishes a Joint Information Center (JIC), Sutter County will dispatch a PIO representative to the JIC if necessary or requested. The representative will maintain a presence at the JIC as long as determined by the situation. News release procedures

will be agreed upon, and established for the Sutter County EOC, the Unified Command, and other interested parties.

Safety and Security

During a potential threat or actual event, employee safety and operational security will be key concerns for Sutter County.

During actual emergency operations, heightened safety and security procedures will be in force and will be followed by county personnel. Security and safety procedures will also be implemented for all command posts and other operational sites. The Sheriff's Department will serve as lead for security functions.

If additional security assets are needed by the Sheriff, they will be requested through mutual aid.

Information Sharing and Dissemination

The threat of a terrorist act or actual terrorist event raises significant issues regarding information sharing and dissemination. Security and confidentiality concerns must be weighed against operational needs and public interest.

The notification of a potential terrorist threat and subsequent updates will be made verbally through the most secure form of landline available. Written confirmations of notification and updates will be used. Emergency response personnel will observe communication security procedures. Sensitive information will not be communicated by cell phone or radio.

Sutter County will have scheduled briefings for EOC staff and other emergency response personnel, If the federal JOC, federal ICP, Incident Unified Command, or JIC are operational, the Sutter County EOC will coordinate briefing times, reporting approaches, and news releases as much as possible with its federal counterparts, as well as with other SEMS levels.

Sheriff's Office

Within the EOC, the Sheriff's Office (SO) will assume the security function. Potential areas which the SO may address are:

- law enforcement mutual aid
- evacuation concerns
- intelligence concerns
- investigative guidelines and statutory authority
- hostage situations, hijackings, kidnappings
- use of force
- bomb procedures
- facility and personnel protection
- use of special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units.

The Sheriff Office will be the lead for crisis management, perimeter security, access control, traffic/crowd control, evacuations, notifications, and safeguarding evidence. Crisis management

activities may include investigation, tracking, and maintaining scene integrity. The Sheriff Office will also coordinate coroner issues.

It will assist with damage assessment and fatalities management.

The Sheriff Office will request law enforcement mutual aid if needed to accomplish these functions.

Fire Services

Fire Services will be the lead for fire response, hazardous materials events, and medical/rescue operations. Fire Services will provide support as necessary to the Sheriff's Office for Crisis Management activities. Existing procedures will be modified as necessary depending on the situation. Fire Services will assist with:

- perimeter and access control
- evacuation operations
- notifications
- safeguarding evidence
- damage assessment
- fatalities management
- addressing environmental needs
- obtaining personnel with radiological training
- insuring decontamination procedures (radiological and chemical) in place and
- Insuring biological agents containment.
- support to Crisis Management activities
- fire and rescue mutual aid
- support to hazardous materials operations
- coordination with EMS and hospitals
- personnel protection issues
- coordination with public works and utilities

Fire Services will request fire and rescue mutual aid if needed to accomplish these functions.

Operations

The Incident Commander (IC) may be the Sheriff (or representative), the County Fire Chief (or representative), or the Health Officer depending on the nature of the situation and availability of staff.

Public Works will serve as lead for damage assessment and will be the representative for utilities concerns. Potential public works activities include:

- reconnaissance of public infrastructure (roads, bridges, facilities, and utilities)
- alternate route identification
- building access
- utility access re-routing

- temporary repairs

It will assist with access and crowd control and fatalities management. Public Works will request public works mutual aid if needed. They will coordinate with the Sheriff Office on security issues if needed.

Planning/Intelligence *See Attachment A, Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism.*

In addition to the standard situation, documentation, demobilization, and resources units, the Planning/Intelligence may include units that address crisis management and consequence management concerns.

Logistics Support *See Attachment A, Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism.*

The Logistics Branch will be responsible for identifying and procuring supplies, services, equipment, and facilities that will be required for both Crisis Management and Consequence management activities.

During emergency operations, particular emphasis will be placed on maintaining OA capabilities of computer systems, telecommunications, including land line and radio.

Finance *See Attachment A, Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism.*

It will be necessary to track costs associated with an event or potential event. Within Finance/Administration Branch there may be a separate Cost Unit to track the costs of the event.

Continuity of Operations

It will be necessary to ensure continuity of day-to-day operations during a potential threat or actual event. This includes payroll processing, contracts management, personnel actions, and file security.

Training and Exercises

Training will be coordinated as necessary to ensure safe, secure, and effective operations of equipment and procedures. The Office of Emergency Management will notify departments, jurisdictions, and agencies of training opportunities as they are available. Any Operational Area grant funds identified to be expended for exercise/training will be coordinated with the Office of Emergency Management to ensure proper allocation/tracking of the funds before expenditure occurs.

Exercises are important for the successful response of personnel during an emergency or disaster. If an exercise interferes or otherwise hampers normal operations the exercise will be terminated and not resumed until such time as the problem is corrected.

Attachment A
EOC Emergency Support Functions - Terrorism

Emergency Support Functions	Management	Operations	Plan/Intel	Logistics	Fin/Admin
ESF-1 Transportation	EO Director, Agency Reps	PW/SO	Resource Tracking And Demobilization	Procurement Branch	
ESF-2 Communication and Information Technology	EO Director, Agency Reps	SO Dispatch	Situation Analysis	Info Tech & Communications Branch	
ESF-3 Public Works and Engineering	OA Public Works Branch Coordinator	PW/Agency Reps	Situation Analysis		
ESF-4 Firefighting	OA Fire Coordinator	Fire Branch	Situation Analysis	Procurement Branch	
ESF-5 Emergency Management	EO Director/Incident Commander	OPS Chief	P&I Chief	Logistics Chief	Admin Chief
ESF-6 Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services	OA Mass Care and Shelter Branch Coordinator	OA Human Services	Situation Analysis	Procurement Branch	
ESF-7 Resource Support	OA Logistics Branch Coordinator		Resource Tracking	Procurement Branch	Finance
ESF-8 Public Health and Medical Services	OA Health Branch Coordinator	Health Unit Leader	Situation Analysis	Procurement Branch	
ESF-9 Urban Search and Rescue	SCSO	SCSO/Fire	Situation Analysis	Procurement Branch	
ESF-10 Oil and HazMat Response	OA HazMat Coordinator	Fire Branch	Situation Analysis		
ESF-11 Agriculture and Natural Resources	Ag Commissioner	AG Branch	Situation Analysis		
ESF-12 Energy	EO Director, Agency Reps	Public Works Branch Chief	Situation Analysis		
ESF-13 Public Safety and Security	OA Law Coordinator	SCSO	Situation Analysis		
ESF-14 Long Term Community Recovery	EO Director		Documentation and Demobilization	Personnel Branch	Finance
ESF-15 External Affairs	EO Director/PIO		P&I Chief		

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Attachment B

FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: COUNTERTERRORISM-SPECIFIC ROLES

A. *Department of Homeland Security (DHS)*

Website: www.dhs.gov

The Department of Homeland Security (Department) was established by Executive Order 13228 on October 8, 2001. Its mission is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States. The Department is to perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission. The Department has functions in the areas of national strategy, detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, response and recovery, incident management, continuity of government, and public affairs. In addition, the Department is to invite and encourage State and local governments to participate in carrying out its functions. In performing its functions, the Department is to work with State and local agencies as appropriate.

The functions of the Department that relate most directly to consequence management planning by State and local agencies are in the preparedness, protection, and response and recovery areas. In the preparedness area, the Department is to coordinate national efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. More specifically, the Department's preparedness functions include coordinating domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice using systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack and coordinating Federal assistance to State and local authorities and nongovernmental organizations to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats or attacks.

In the protection area, the Department is to coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. More specifically, the Department's protection functions include developing criteria for reviewing whether appropriate security measures are in place at major public and privately owned facilities and coordinating efforts to protect critical public and privately owned information systems.

In the response and recovery area, the Department's functions include coordinating efforts to ensure rapid restoration of critical infrastructure facilities and critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist attack; coordinating Federal plans and programs to provide medical, financial, and other assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and their families; and coordinating containment and removal of biological, chemical, radiological, explosive, or other hazardous materials in the event of a terrorist threat or attack involving such hazards and coordinating efforts to mitigate the effects of such an attack.

1. **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)** The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence management and acts in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Washington, D.C., and on the scene of the crisis until the U.S. Attorney General transfers the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) role to FEMA. Though State and local officials bear primary responsibility for consequence management, FEMA coordinates the Federal aspects of consequence management in the event of a terrorist act. Under Presidential Decision Directive 39, FEMA supports the overall LFA by operating as the lead agency for consequence management until the overall LFA role is transferred to FEMA and in this capacity determines when consequences are “imminent” for purposes of the Stafford Act (Source: Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, April 1999). Consequence management includes protecting the public health and safety and providing emergency relief to State governments, businesses, and individuals. Additional information on Federal response is given in the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.

Web site: www.fema.gov

- a. **Office of National Preparedness (ONP).** The ONP develops and implements strategies for FEMA involvement in terrorism-related activities and coordinates overall relationships with other Federal departments and agencies involved in the consequence management response to terrorism-related activities.
- b. **Readiness, Response and Recovery (RRR).** The Readiness, Response and recovery Directorate is responsible for planning, training, conducting exercises, and leadership in the Federal consequence management response to terrorist events. The RRR Directorate develops and produces terrorism consequence management planning guidance for State and local governments, manages the terrorism consequence management planning assistance used by State and local governments for terrorism preparedness, and, in accordance with the Federal Response Plan (FRP), manages Federal activities required to support State and local governments in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. The RRR directorate’s terrorism-related FRP functions include these:
 - 1) It is responsible for planning, coordination, and operations related to national security special events.
 - 2) It provides training for emergency managers, firefighters, and elected officials in consequence management through the Emergency Management Institute (EMI), National Fire

Academy (NFA), and National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

- 3) EMI offers courses for first responders dealing with the consequences of terrorist incidents through the Comprehensive Exercise Program. These exercises provide the opportunity to test the ability of different levels of response to interact effectively.
 - 4) It manages the Rapid Response Information System, which inventories physical assets and equipment available to State and local officials and provides a database of chemical and biological agents and safety precautions.
- c. **Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA).** FIMA is responsible for FEMA's mitigation programs, which seek to minimize damages and losses from all hazards, including terrorist attacks. The Building Process Assistance Teams, made up of engineering and construction professionals, help by providing thorough analyses of structures as well as information that can be used by communities as they rebuild. Mitigation programs also provide a variety of technical services, including verified and validated airborne and waterborne hazardous material models. FIMA is also responsible for developing new, technologically advanced, remote sensing capabilities needed to assess the release and dispersion of hazardous materials, both in air and water, for guiding consequence management response activities.
- d. **U.S. Fire Administration (USFA).** USFA provides training to firefighters and other first responders through the NFA in conjunction with the Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate. The NFA offers courses pertaining to preparedness and response to terrorist events.
- e. **Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO).** This Office focuses on strategic and external matters regarding information technology, including e-government, homeland security, and cyber security.

B. Department of Justice (DOJ)

Web site: www.usdoj.gov

1. **Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management and investigation of all terrorism-related matters, including incidents involving a WMD. Within FBI's role as LFA, the FBI Federal On-Scene Commander (OSC) coordinates the overall Federal response until the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA.

Web site: www.fbi.gov

- a. **FBI Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section (DTCTPS).** Within the FBI Counter Terrorism Division is a specialized section containing the Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit, and the Special Event Management Unit. Each of these units has specific responsibilities in investigations of crimes or allegations of crimes committed by individuals or groups in violation of the Federal terrorism and/or Weapons of Mass Destruction statutes. The DTCTPS serves as the point of contact (POC) to the FBI field offices and command structure as well as other Federal agencies in incidences of terrorism, the use or suspected use of WMD and/or the evaluation of threat credibility. If the FBI's Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) is operational for exercises or actual incidents, the DTCTPS will provide staff personnel to facilitate the operation of SIOC. During an incident, the FBI DTCTPS will coordinate the determination of the composition of the Domestic Emergency Support Teams (DEST) and/or the Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST). The DTCTPS WMD Operations Unit will coordinate all incidents, wherein a WMD is used.
- b. **FBI Laboratory Division.** Within the FBI's Laboratory Division reside numerous assets, which can deploy to provide assistance in a terrorism/WMD incident. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) personnel are highly trained and knowledgeable and are equipped to direct and assist in the collection of hazardous and/or toxic evidence in a contaminated environment. Similarly, the Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU) is available to augment the local assets and have been trained in the collection of contaminated evidence. The Crisis Response Unit (CRU) is able to deploy to provide communications support to an incident. The Bomb Data Center (BDC) provides the baseline training to public safety bomb disposal technicians in the United States. BDC is the certification and accreditation authority for public safety agencies operating bomb squads and is in possession of equipment and staff that can be deployed to assist in the resolution of a crisis involving suspected or identified explosive devices. The Explosives Unit (EU) has experts who can assist in analyzing the construction of suspected or identified devices and recommend procedures to neutralize those items.
- c. **FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG).** CIRG has developed assets that are designed to facilitate the resolution of crisis incidents of any type. Notably, the Crisis Management Unit (CMU), which conducts training and exercises for the FBI and has

developed the concept of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), is available to provide on-scene assistance to the incident and integrate the concept of the JOC and the Incident Command System (ICS) to create efficient management of the situation. CIRG coordinates a highly trained group of skilled negotiators who are adroit in techniques to de-escalate volatile situations. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) is a tactical asset, trained to function in contaminated or toxic hazard environments, that is available to assist in the management of the incident.

2. **Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)** This office, within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), has a State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program that provides technical assistance in three areas: (1) general technical assistance; (2) State strategy technical assistance, and (3) equipment technical assistance. The purpose of this program is to provide direct assistance to State and local jurisdictions in enhancing their capacity and preparedness to respond to WMD terrorist incidents.

The program goals are to:

- Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to develop, plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness; and
- Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to sustain and maintain specialized equipment.

Technical assistance available from ODP is provided without charge to requesting State or local jurisdiction. The following organizations are eligible for the State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program:

- General technical assistance: units and agencies of State and local governments.
 - State strategy technical assistance: State administrative agencies, designated by the governor, under the Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program.
 - Equipment technical assistance: units and agencies of State and local governments that have received ODP funding to acquire specialized equipment.
- a. **General Technical Assistance.** ODP provides general overall assistance to State and local jurisdictions for preparedness to respond to WMD terrorist incidents. This technical assistance includes:

- 1) Assistance in developing and enhancing WMD response plans.
 - 2) Assistance with exercise scenario development and evaluation.
 - 3) Provision of WMD experts to facilitate jurisdictional working groups.
 - 4) Provision of specialized training.
- b. **State Strategy Technical Assistance.** ODP provides assistance to States in meeting the needs assessment and comprehensive planning requirements under ODP's Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. Specifically, ODP:
- 1) Assists States in developing their three-year statewide domestic preparedness strategy.
 - 2) Assists States in utilizing the assessment tools for completion of the required needs and threat assessments.
- c. **Equipment Technical Assistance.** ODP provides training by mobile training teams on the use and maintenance of specialized WMD response equipment under ODP's Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. This assistance will be delivered on site in eligible jurisdictions. Specifically, ODP:
- 1) Provides training on using, sustaining, and maintaining specialized equipment.
 - 2) Provides training to technicians on maintenance and calibration of test equipment.
 - 3) Provides maintenance and/or calibration of equipment.
 - 4) Assists in refurbishing used or damaged equipment.

C. Department of Defense (DoD)

Web site: www.defenselink.mil

In the event of a terrorist attack or act of nature on American soil resulting in the release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices, the local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the attack. The Department of Defense (DoD) has many unique war-fighting support capabilities, both technical and operational, that could be used in support of State and local authorities, if requested by FEMA to support and manage the consequences of such a domestic event.

Due to the increasing volatility of the threat and the time sensitivity associated with providing effective support to FEMA in domestic CBRNE incident, the Secretary of Defense appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD[CS]). The ATSD(CS) serves as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for the oversight of policy, requirements, priorities, resources, and programs related to the DoD role in managing the consequences of a domestic incident involving the naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosives. When requested, the DoD will provide its unique and extensive resources in accordance with the following principles. First, DoD will ensure an unequivocal chain of responsibility, authority, and accountability for its actions to ensure the American people that the military will follow the basic constructs of lawful action when an emergency occurs. Second, in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE event, DoD will always play a supporting role to the LFA in accordance with all applicable law and plans. Third, DoD support will emphasize its natural role, skills, and structures to mass mobilize and provide logistical support. Fourth, DoD will purchase equipment and provide support in areas that are largely related to its war-fighting mission. Fifth, reserve component forces are DoD's forward-deployed forces for domestic consequence management. All official requests for DoD support to CBRNE consequence management (CM) incidents are made by the LFA to the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense. While the LFA may submit the requests for DoD assistance through other DoD channels, immediately upon receipt, any request that comes to any DoD element shall be forwarded to the Executive Secretary. In each instance the Executive Secretary will take the necessary action so that the Deputy Secretary can determine whether the incident warrants special operational management. In such instances, upon issuance of Secretary of Defense guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff will translate the Secretary's decisions into military orders for these CBRNE-CM events, under the policy oversight of the ATSD(CS). If the Deputy Secretary of Defense determines that DoD support for a particular CBRNE-CM incident does not require special consequence management procedures, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DoD Executive Agent through normal Director of Military Support, Military Support to Civil

Authorities (MSCA) procedures, with policy oversight by the ATSD(CS). As noted above, DoD assets are tailored primarily for the larger war-fighting mission overseas. But in recognition of the unique challenges of responding to a domestic CBRNE incident, the Department established a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTFCFS) headquarters at the United States Joint Forces Command, to plan for and integrate DoD's consequence management support to the LFA for events in the continental United States. The United States Pacific Command and United States Southern Command have parallel responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities for States, territories, and possessions outside the continental United States. Specific units with skills applicable to a domestic consequence management role can be found in the Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) database maintained by FEMA. Capabilities include detection, decontamination, medical, and logistics.

Additionally, DoD has established 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), each composed of 22 well-trained and equipped full-time National Guard personnel. Upon Secretary of Defense certification, one WMD-CST will be stationed in each of the 10 FEMA regions around the country, ready to provide support when directed by their respective governors. Their mission is to deploy rapidly, assist local responders in determining the precise nature of an attack, provide expert technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on military assets. By Congressional direction, DoD is in the process of establishing and training an additional 17 WMD-CSTs to support the U.S. population. Interstate agreements provide a process for the WMD-CST and other National Guard assets to be used by neighboring states. If national security requirements dictate, these units may be transferred to Federal service.

D. Department of Energy (DOE)

1. Through its Office of Emergency Response, the DOE manages radiological emergency response assets that support both crisis and consequence management response in the event of an incident involving a WMD. The DOE is prepared to respond immediately to any type of radiological accident or incident with its radiological emergency response assets.
2. Through its Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, the DOE coordinates activities in nonproliferation, international nuclear safety, and communicated threat assessment. DOE maintains the following capabilities that support domestic terrorism preparedness and response.

Web site: www.dp.doe.gov/emergencyresponse/

1. **Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** Radiological assistance operations may require the use of aerial monitoring to quickly determine the extent and degree of the dispersal of airborne or deposited radioactivity or the location of lost or diverted radioactive materials. The AMS is an aircraft-

operated radiation detection system that uses fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters equipped with state-of-the-art technology instrumentation to track, monitor, and sample airborne radioactive plumes and/or detect and measure radioactive material deposited on the ground. The AMS capabilities reside at both Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C. The fixed-wing aircraft provide a rapid assessment of the contaminated area, whereas the helicopters provide a slower, more detailed and accurate analysis of the contamination.

- a. For facilities or materials regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), or by an NRC Agreement State, the technical response is led by NRC as the LFA (in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) and supported by DOE as needed.

2. **Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC).** Radiological assistance operations may require the use of computer models to assist in estimating early phase radiological consequences of radioactive material accidentally released into the atmosphere. The ARAC is a computer-based atmospheric dispersion and deposition modeling capability operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The ARAC's role in an emergency begins when a nuclear, chemical, or other hazardous material is, or has the potential of being, released into the atmosphere. The ARAC's capability consists of meteorologists and other technical staff using three-dimensional computer models and real-time weather data to project the dispersion and deposition of radioactive material in the environment. The ARAC's computer output consists of graphical contour plots showing predicted estimates for instantaneous air and ground contamination levels, air immersion and ground-level exposure rates, and integrated effective dose equivalents for individuals or critical populations. The plots can be overlaid on local maps to assist emergency response officials in deciding what protective actions are needed to effectively protect people and the environment. Protective actions could impact distribution of food and water sources and include sheltering and evacuating critical population groups. The ARAC's response time is typically 30 minutes to 2 hours after notification of an incident.
3. **Accident Response Group (ARG).** ARG is DOE's primary emergency response capability for responding to emergencies involving United States nuclear weapons. The ARG, which is managed by the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office, is composed of a cadre of approximately 300 technical and scientific experts, including senior scientific advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and high-explosive safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE weapons complex. ARG members will deploy with highly specialized, state-of-the-art equipment for weapons

recovery and monitoring operations. The ARG deploys on military or commercial aircraft using a time-phased approach. The ARG advance elements are ready to deploy within four hours of notification. ARG advance elements focus on initial assessment and provide preliminary advice to decision makers. When the follow-on elements arrive at the emergency scene, detailed health and safety evaluations and operations are performed and weapon recovery operations are initiated.

4. **Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).** For major radiological emergencies impacting the United States, the DOE establishes a FRMAC. The center is the control point for all Federal assets involved in the monitoring and assessment of offsite radiological conditions. The FRMAC provides support to the affected states, coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities, maintains a technical liaison with Tribal nations and State and local governments, responds to the assessment needs of the LFA, and meets the statutory responsibilities of the participating Federal agency.
5. **Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).** NEST is DOE's program for dealing with the technical aspects of nuclear or radiological terrorism. A NEST consists of engineers, scientists, and other technical specialists from the DOE national laboratories and other contractors. NEST resources are configured to be quickly transported by military or commercial aircraft to worldwide locations and prepared to respond 24 hours a day using a phased and flexible approach to deploying personnel and equipment. The NEST is deployable within four hours of notification with specially trained teams and equipment to assist the FBI in handling nuclear or radiological threats. Response teams vary in size from a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of searchers and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical operations on a suspected nuclear device. The NEST capabilities include intelligence, communications, search, assessment, access, diagnostics, render-safe operations, operations containment/damage mitigation, logistics, and health physics.
6. **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** Under the RAP, the DOE provides, upon request, radiological assistance to DOE program elements, other Federal agencies, State, Tribal, and local governments, private groups, and individuals. RAP provides resources (trained personnel and equipment) to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation of actual or perceived radiation hazards and risks to workers, the public, and the environment. RAP is implemented on a regional basis, with regional coordination between the emergency response elements of the States, Tribes, other Federal agencies, and DOE. Each RAP Region maintains a minimum of three RAP teams, which are comprised of DOE and DOE contractor personnel, to provide radiological assistance within their region of responsibility. RAP teams consist of volunteer members who perform radiological assistance duties as part of their formal employment or as part

of the terms of the contract between their employer and DOE. A fully configured team consists of seven members; to include one Team Leader, one Team Captain, four health physics survey/support personnel, and one Public Information Officer (PIO). A RAP team may deploy with two or more members depending on the potential hazards, risks, or the emergency or incident scenario. Multiple RAP teams may also be deployed to an accident if warranted by the situation.

7. **Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).** DOE's Oak Ridge Institute manages the REAC/TS for Science and Education in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The REAC/TS maintains a 24-hour response center staffed with personnel and equipment to support medical aspects of radiological emergencies. The staff consists of physicians, nurses, paramedics, and health physicists who provide medical consultation and advice and/or direct medical support at the accident scene. The REAC/TS capabilities include assessment and treatment of internal and external contamination, whole-body counting, radiation dose estimation, and medical and radiological triage.
8. **Communicated Threat Credibility Assessment.** DOE is the program manager for the Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) at LLNL. The NAP is a DOE-funded asset specifically designed to provide technical, operational, and behavioral assessments of the credibility of communicated threats directed against the U.S. Government and its interests. The assessment process includes one-hour initial and four-hour final products which, when integrated by the FBI as part of its threat assessment process, can lead to a "go/no go" decision for response to a nuclear threat.

E. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the lead Federal agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 (health and medical services), provides coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency. Additionally, HHS provides support during developing or potential medical situations and has the responsibility for Federal support of food, drug, and sanitation issues. HHS operational support to FEMA may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (National Pharmaceutical Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided through the National Disaster Medical System. Resources are furnished when State and local resources are overwhelmed and public health and/or medical assistance is requested from the Federal government.

HHS, in its primary agency role for ESF #8, coordinates the provision of Federal health and medical assistance to fulfill the requirements identified by the affected State/local authorities having jurisdiction. Included in ESF #8 is overall public health response; triage, treatment, and transportation of victims of the disaster; and evacuation of patients

out of the disaster area, as needed, into a network of Military Services, Veterans Affairs, and pre-enrolled non-Federal hospitals located in the major metropolitan areas of the United States. ESF #8 utilizes resources primarily available from (1) within HHS, (2) ESF #8 support agencies, (3) the National Disaster Medical System, and (4) specific non-Federal sources (major pharmaceutical suppliers, hospital supply vendors, international disaster response organizations, and international health organizations). Under federal law, the Secretary of HHS has authority to regulate or prevent travel and shipments of goods between states in order to control the spread of communicable disease, including the authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release individuals with particular diseases. Within HHS, CDC has been delegated authority for interstate quarantine over persons, while FDA has regulatory authority over animals and other products that may transmit or spread communicable diseases.

Web site: www.hhs.gov

1. **Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP).** OEP manages and coordinates Federal health, medical, and health-related social service response and recovery to Federally declared disasters under the Federal Response Plan. The major functions of OEP include:
 - a. Coordination and delivery of Department-wide emergency preparedness activities, including continuity of government, continuity of operations, and emergency assistance during disasters and other emergencies;
 - b. Coordination of the health and medical response of the Federal government, in support of State and local governments, in the aftermath of terrorist acts involving WMD; and
 - c. Direction and maintenance of the medical response component of the National Disaster Medical System, including development and operational readiness capability of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams and other special teams that can be deployed as the primary medical response teams in case of disasters.
2. **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).** CDC is the Federal agency responsible for protecting the public health of the country through prevention and control of diseases and for response to public health emergencies. CDC works with national and international agencies to eradicate or control communicable diseases and other preventable conditions. The CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program oversees the agency's effort to prepare State and local governments to respond to acts of bioterrorism. In addition, CDC has designated emergency response personnel throughout the agency who are responsible for responding to biological, chemical, and radiological terrorism. CDC has epidemiologists trained to investigate and control outbreaks or illnesses, as well as laboratories capable of quantifying an individual's exposure to biological or chemical agents. CDC maintains the Strategic

National Stockpile (SNS) to respond to terrorist incidents within the United States.

Web site: www.cdc.gov

2. **National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).** NDMS is a cooperative asset-sharing partnership between HHS, DoD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), FEMA, State and local governments, and the private sector. The System has three components: direct medical care, patient evacuation, and the non-Federal hospital bed system. NDMS was created as a nationwide medical response system to supplement State and local medical resources during disasters and emergencies, provide backup medical support to the military and VA health care systems during an overseas conventional conflict, and to promote development of community-based disaster medical service systems. This partnership includes DoD and VA Federal Coordinating Centers, which provide patient beds, as well as 1,990 civilian hospitals. NDMS is also comprised of over 7,000 private-sector medical and support personnel organized into many teams across the nation. These teams and other special medical teams are deployed to provide immediate medical attention to the sick and injured during disasters, when local emergency response systems become overloaded.
 - 1 **Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT).** A DMAT is a group of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide emergency medical care during a disaster or other event. During a WMD incident, the DMAT provides clean area medical care in the form of medical triage and patient stabilization for transport to tertiary care.
 - 2 **National Medical Response Team–Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMRTWMD).** The NMRT-WMD is a specialized response force designed to provide medical care following a nuclear, biological, and/or chemical incident. This unit is capable of providing mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, and primary and secondary medical care to stabilize victims for transportation to tertiary care facilities in a hazardous material environment. There are four such teams geographically dispersed throughout the United States.
 - 3 **Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT).** The DMORT is a mobile team of mortuary care specialists who have the capability to respond to incidents involving fatalities from transportation accidents, natural disasters, and/or terrorist events. The team provides technical assistance and supports mortuary operations, as needed for mass fatality incidents.

F. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

EPA is chartered to respond to WMD releases under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) regardless of the cause of the release. EPA is authorized by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); the Oil Pollution Act; and the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to Know Act to support Federal, State, and local responders in counterterrorism.

EPA will provide support to the FBI during crisis management in response to a terrorist incident. In its crisis management role, the EPA On-Scene Commander (OSC) may provide the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) with technical advice and recommendations, scientific and technical assessments, and assistance (as needed) to State and local responders. The EPA OSC will support FEMA during consequence management for the incident. EPA carries out its response according to the FRP, ESF #10, Hazardous Materials. The OSC may request an Environmental Response Team that is funded by EPA if the terrorist incident exceeds available local and regional resources. EPA is the chair for the National Response Team (NRT). The following EPA reference material and planning guidance is recommended for State, Tribal, and local planners:

1. Thinking About Deliberate Releases: Steps Your Community Can Take, 1995 (EPA 550-F-95-001).
2. Environmental Protection Agency's Role in Counterterrorism Activities, 1998 (EPA 550-F-98-014).
3. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1), prepared by the National Response Team, available at <http://www.nrt.org>.
4. LEPCs and Deliberate Releases: Addressing Terrorist Activities in the Local Emergency Plan, available at <http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/factsheets/lepccct.pdf>.

Web site: www.epa.gov

G. Department of Agriculture

It is the policy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to be prepared to respond swiftly in the event of national security, natural disaster, technological, and other emergencies at the national, regional, State, and county levels to provide support and comfort to the people of the United States. USDA has a major role in ensuring the safety of food for all Americans. One concern is bio-terrorism and its effect on agriculture in rural America, namely crops in the field, animals on the hoof, and food safety issues related to food in the food chain between the slaughterhouse and/or processing facilities and the consumer.

Web site: www.usda.gov

1. **The Office of Crisis Planning and Management (OCPM).** This USDA office coordinates the emergency planning, preparedness, and crisis management functions and the suitability for employment investigations of the Department. It also maintains the USDA Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP).
2. **USDA State Emergency Boards (SEBs).** The SEBs have responsibility for coordinating USDA emergency activities at the State level.
3. **The Farm Service Agency.** This USDA agency develops and administers emergency plans and controls covering food processing, storage, and wholesale distribution; distribution and use of seed; and manufacture, distribution, and use of livestock and poultry feed.
4. **The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).** This USDA agency provides food assistance in officially designated disaster areas upon request by the designated State agency. Generally, the food assistance response from FNS includes authorization of Emergency Food Stamp Program benefits and use of USDA-donated foods for emergency mass feeding and household distribution, as necessary. FNS also maintains a current inventory of USDA-donated food held in Federal, State, and commercial warehouses and provides leadership to the FRP under ESF #11, Food.
5. **Food Safety and Inspection Service.** This USDA agency inspects meat/meat products, poultry/poultry products, and egg products in slaughtering and processing plants; assists the Food and Drug Administration in the inspection of other food products; develops plans and procedures for radiological emergency response in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP); and provides support, as required, to the FRP at the national and regional levels.
6. **Natural Resources Conservation Service.** This USDA agency provides technical assistance to individuals, communities, and governments relating to proper use of land for agricultural production; provides assistance in determining the extent of damage to agricultural land and water; and provides support to the FRP under ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering.
7. **Agricultural Research Service (ARS).** This USDA agency develops and carries out all necessary research programs related to crop or livestock diseases; provides technical support for emergency programs and activities in the areas of planning, prevention, detection, treatment, and management of consequences; provides technical support for the development of guidance information on the effects of radiation, biological, and chemical agents on agriculture; develops and maintains current inventory of ARS controlled laboratories that can be mobilized on short notice for

emergency testing of food, feed, and water safety; and provides biological, chemical, and radiological safety support for USDA.

8. **Economic Research Service.** This USDA agency, in cooperation with other departmental agencies, analyzes the impacts of the emergency on the U.S. agricultural system, as well as on rural communities, as part of the process of developing strategies to respond to the effects of an emergency.
9. **Rural Business-Cooperative Service.** This USDA agency, in cooperation with other government agencies at all levels, promotes economic development in affected rural areas by developing strategies that respond to the conditions created by an emergency.
10. **Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.** This USDA agency protects livestock, poultry, crops, biological resources, and products thereof, from diseases, pests, and hazardous agents (biological, chemical, and radiological); assesses the damage to agriculture of any such introduction; and coordinates the utilization and disposal of livestock and poultry exposed to hazardous agents.
11. **Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES).** This USDA agency coordinates use of land grant and other cooperating State college, and university services and other relevant research institutions in carrying out all responsibilities for emergency programs. CSREES administers information and education services covering (a) farmers, other rural residents, and the food and agricultural industries on emergency needs and conditions; (b) vulnerability of crops and livestock to the effects of hazardous agents (biological, chemical, and radiological); and (c) technology for emergency agricultural production. This agency maintains a close working relationship with the news media. CSREES will provide guidance on the most efficient procedures to assure continuity and restoration of an agricultural technical information system under emergency conditions.
12. **Rural Housing Service.** This USDA agency will assist the Department of housing and Urban Development by providing living quarters in unoccupied rural housing in an emergency situation.
13. **Rural Utilities Service.** This USDA agency will provide support to the FRP under ESF #12, Energy, at the national level.
14. **Office of Inspector General (OIG).** This USDA office is the Department's principal law enforcement component and liaison with the FBI. OIG, in concert with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, is prepared to investigate any terrorist attacks relating to the nation's agriculture sector, to identify subjects, interview witnesses, and secure evidence in preparation for Federal prosecution. As necessary, OIG will examine USDA programs regarding counterterrorism-related matters.

15. **Forest Service (FS).** This USDA agency will prevent and control fires in rural areas in cooperation with State, local, and Tribal governments, and appropriate Federal departments and agencies. They will determine and report requirements for equipment, personnel, fuels, chemicals, and other materials needed for carrying out assigned duties. The FS will furnish personnel and equipment for search and rescue work and other emergency measures in national forests and on other lands where a temporary lead role will reduce suffering or loss of life. The FS will provide leadership to the FRP under ESF #4, Firefighting, and support to the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), as required, at the national and regional levels. FS will allocate and assign radio frequencies for use by agencies and staff offices of USDA. FS will also operate emergency radio communications systems in support of local, regional, and national firefighting teams. Lastly, the FS law enforcement officers can serve as support to OIG in major investigations of acts of terrorism against agricultural lands and products.

H. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, retains Federal lead responsibility for facilities or materials regulated by the NRC or by an NRC Agreement State. The NRC's counterterrorism-specific role, at these facilities or material sites, is to exercise the Federal lead for radiological safety while supporting other Federal, State and local agencies in Crisis and Consequence Management.

Web site: www.nrc.gov

1. **Radiological Safety Assessment.** The NRC will provide the facility (or for materials, the user) technical advice to ensure onsite measures are taken to mitigate offsite consequences. The NRC will serve as the primary Federal source of information regarding on-site radiological conditions and off-site radiological effects. The NRC will support the technical needs of other agencies by providing descriptions of devices or facilities containing radiological materials and assessing the safety impact of terrorist actions and of proposed tactical operations of any responders. Safety assessments will be coordinated through NRC liaison at the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), Command Post (CP), and Joint Operations Center (JOC).
2. **Protective Action Recommendations.** The licensee and State have the primary responsibility for recommending and implementing, respectively, actions to protect the public. They will, if necessary, act, without prior consultation with Federal officials, to initiate protective actions for the public and responders. The NRC will contact State and local authorities and offer advice and assistance on the technical assessment of the radiological hazard and, if requested, provide advice on protective actions

for the public. The NRC will coordinate any recommendations for protective actions through NRC liaison at the CP or JOC.

3. **Responder Radiation Protection.** The NRC will assess the potential radiological hazards to any responders and coordinate with the facility radiation protection staff to ensure that personnel responding to the scene are observing the appropriate precautions.
4. **Information Coordination.** The NRC will supply other responders and government officials with timely information concerning the radiological aspects of the event. The NRC will liaison with the Joint Information Center to coordinate information concerning the Federal response.

I. Department of Labor

Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Under its mandate to help protect the safety and health of workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can provide resources to help protect rescue and recovery workers following a terrorist attack. Activities include monitoring and sampling for hazards, analyzing the resulting air and bulk samples at OSHA's technical center, and disseminating sampling results; distributing respirators and conducting quantitative fit testing of negative pressure respirators; conducting assessments of the hazards and potential health and safety risks to workers involved in rescue and recovery at a terrorist attack site; distributing hard hats, safety glasses and goggles, gloves, and other personal protective equipment at the site of an explosive or incendiary attack; and inspecting cranes and riggings for hazards. The Department of Labor can also fund training programs to help protect responders from biological or chemical hazards. Development of an anthrax/biohazard cleanup training program that utilizes OSHA and union expertise has been funded in the wake of the anthrax attacks in the autumn of 2001.

Attachment C

WMD INCIDENT INDICATIONS AND FIRST RESPONDER CONCERNS

NOTE: Extensive additional information on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) hazards and response, including information addressing first responder concerns, is available from various commercial publishers.

A. BIOLOGICAL

1. **Indications.** Indicators that a WMD incident involving biological agents has taken place may take days or weeks to manifest themselves, depending on the biological toxin or pathogen involved.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recently developed the following list of epidemiologic clues that may signal a bioterrorist event:

- a. Large number of ill persons with a similar disease or syndrome.
- b. Large numbers of unexplained disease, syndrome, or deaths.
- c. Unusual illness in a population or workplace.
- d. Higher morbidity and mortality than expected with a common disease or syndrome.
- e. Failure of a common disease to respond to usual therapy.
- f. Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent.
- g. Multiple unusual or unexplained disease entities coexisting in the same patient without other explanation.
- h. Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.
- i. Multiple atypical presentations of disease agents.
- j. Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or spatially distinct sources.
- k. Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of agent.
- l. Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence.
- m. Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in noncontiguous areas, domestic or foreign.

- n. Atypical aerosol, food, water, or powder transmission.
- o. Ill people presenting near the same time.
- p. Deaths or illness among animals that precedes or accompanies illness or death in humans.
- q. No illness in people not exposed to common ventilation systems, but illness among those people in proximity to the systems.

2. First Responder Concerns

- a. The most practical method of initiating widespread infection using biological agents is through aerosol delivery, where fine particles are sprayed over or upwind of a target where the particles may be inhaled. An aerosol may be effective for some time after delivery, since it will be deposited on clothing, equipment, and soil. When the clothing is used later, or dust is stirred up, responding personnel may be subject to “secondary” contamination.
- b. Biological agents may be able to use portals of entry into the body other than the respiratory tract. Individuals may be infected by ingestion of contaminated food and water, or even by direct contact with the skin or mucous membranes through abraded or broken skin. Use protective clothing or commercially available Level C clothing. Protect the respiratory tract through the use of a mask with biological high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters.
- c. Exposure to biological agents, as noted above, may not be immediately apparent. Casualties may occur minutes, hours, days, or weeks after an exposure has occurred. The time required before signs and symptoms are observed is dependent on the agent used. While symptoms will be evident, often the first confirmation will come from blood tests or by other diagnostic means used by medical personnel.

B. CHEMICAL

1. **Indications.** The following may indicate a potential chemical WMD has been released. There may be one or more of these indicators present.

- a. An unusually large or noticeable number of sick or dead wildlife. These may range from pigeons in parks to rodents near trash containers.
- b. Lack of insect life. Shorelines, puddles, and any standing water should be checked for the presence of dead insects.
- c. Considerable number of persons experiencing water-like blisters, weals (like bee-stings), and/or rashes.

- d. Numbers of individuals exhibiting serious health problems, ranging from nausea, excessive secretions (saliva, diarrhea, vomiting), disorientation, and difficulty breathing to convulsions and death.
- e. Discernable pattern to the casualties. This may be “aligned” with the wind direction or related to where the weapon was released (indoors/outdoors).

- f. Presence of unusual liquid droplets, e.g., surfaces exhibit oily droplets or film or water surfaces have an oily film (with no recent rain).

- g. Unscheduled spraying or unusual application of spray.

- h. Abandoned spray devices, such as chemical sprayers used by landscaping crews.

- i. Presence of unexplained or unusual odors (where that particular scent or smell is not normally noted).

- j. Presence of low-lying clouds or fog-like condition not compatible with the weather.

- k. Presence of unusual metal debris—unexplained bomb/munitions material, particularly if it contains a liquid.

- l. Explosions that disperse or dispense liquids, mists, vapors, or gas.

- m. Explosions that seem to destroy only a package or bomb device.

- n. Civilian panic in potential high-profile target areas (e.g., government buildings, mass transit systems, sports arenas, etc.).

- o. Mass casualties without obvious trauma.

2. First Responder Concerns.

The first concern must be to recognize a chemical event and protect the first responders. Unless first responders recognize the danger, they will very possibly become casualties in a chemical environment. It may not be possible to determine from the symptoms experienced by affected personnel which chemical agent has been used. Chemical agents may be combined and therefore recognition of agents involved becomes more difficult.

C. NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL

1. Indications.

Radiation is an invisible hazard. There are no initial characteristics or properties of radiation itself that are noticeable. Unless the nuclear/radiological material is marked to identify it as such, it may be some time before the hazard has been identified as radiological.

2. First Responder Concerns.

While there is no single piece of equipment that is capable of detecting all forms of radiation, there are several different detectors for each type of radiation. Availability of this equipment, in addition to protective clothing and respiratory equipment is of great concern to first responders.

D. EXPLOSIVE/INCENDIARY

1. **Indications.** Explosions and fires are sensate. They are readily seen and heard

2. First Responder Concerns.

a. Emergency response units tend to be thin at the leadership level. Commanders may be tempted to leave their command posts to participate directly in lifesaving activities that should be performed by their staffs. Commanders should show discipline, not put themselves at undue risk, and continue to lead the response until relieved.

b. Explosions and incendiary devices can cause fires. Thus one concern of first responders is to extinguish fires and rescue persons endangered by fire without putting themselves at undue risk. Fires may initiate secondary explosions, which may put secondary responders at risk of harm from blast.

c. The incendiary terrorist attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) demonstrated that intense heat can cause skyscrapers to collapse. First responders can be harmed by the collapsing structure or by the consequential spread of debris.

d. In the incendiary attack on the World Trade Center a 42-story building (WTC Building 7) collapsed although it was not directly struck by an airplane. Some engineers believe that falling debris from the buildings struck caused ignition of tank of diesel fuel (for emergency generators) that was a factor in the collapse. Such diesel generators are common sources of emergency power and in large buildings may require tanks with tens of thousands of gallons of diesel fuel. First responders should be cognizant of possible collapse of adjacent buildings in defining the area of risk and in locating incident command posts.

e. Terrorist attacks employing explosives, especially those involving suicide bombers and car bombs may include secondary devices targeted against responders.

f. A number of first responders to the attack on the World Trade Center became ill from inhalation of health endangering particulates and aerosols. Sampling by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) found some samples of respirable silica to be above OSHA limit and instances of overexposure to copper, iron oxide, lead, and cadmium².